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1. Introduction

C

onmet classification has been and will continue to be one of the most complex issues arising from the intersection of national security policy and internationallaw. From the inception of what the United States dubbed the "Global
War o n Terror," experts have been debating the meaning of the term "armed confli ct," both international and non -international. The proliferation of remotely piloted warfare has only exacerbated the uncertainty associated with the meaning of
these terms. In response, the concept of self-defense targeting emerged as an ostensible alternative to determining if and when a national llsear armed force qualified
as an armed conflict. In essence, this theory averts the need to engage in jus in bello l
classification of counterterror military operations by relying on the overarchingjus
ad bellum2 legal justification for these o perations. Self-defense targeting, or what
Professor Ken neth Anderson has called "naked self-defense,") is offered as the U.S.
legal fra m ework for employing com bat power to destroy or disrupt the capabilities
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Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello
of transnational terrorist o peratives. 4 This essay will q uestion the validity of substitutingjus ad bellutn principles for those of the jus in bello, and why this substitution
is a false solution to this extremely complex conflict classification dilemma.
The attack on Osama Bin Laden's (OBL) com pound in Pakistan S has exposed in
stark relief the importance of defining the legal framework applicable to the use of
military force as a counterterrorism tool. The initial focus of the public debate generated by the attack was the legitimacy of the U.S. invocation of the inherent right
of self-defense to launch a non -consensual operation within the sovereign territory
of Pakistan.6 However, that foc us soon shifted to another critical legal q uestion:
even assuming the exercise of national self-defense was legitimate, what law regulated the tactical execution of the operationF By virtue of his role as the leader of al
Qaeda, was O BL a lawful military objective within the meaning of the law of armed
conflict (LOAC),8 and thereby subject to attack with deadly force as a measure of
first resort? Or was he merely an international criminal, subject to a m uch more
limited law enforcement use of force authority? The d uality of the jus belli issues
im plicated by the attack generated a two-pronged legal critique: First, did the mission violate the international legal prohibition against use of force (jus ad bellutn)?
Second, did the mission trigger the law of armed conflict, or was the amount of
force employed during the mission resulting in OBL's death excessive to that which
was necessary to apprehend him ? The self-defense targeting theory failed to sufficiently address this duality.
The first prong of this dualistic legal debate to uches on an issue that appears
well-settled in U.S. practice: the use of military force to attack individuals who are
determined to be al Qaeda o r Taliban belligerent operatives. The second pronghow such attacks are legally regulated at the tactical execution level-remains a
subject of uncertainty. Bo th Presidents Bush and Obama (with the support of
Congress) consistently invoked the inherent right of national self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations as the legal basis for attacking al Qaeda operatives.9 However, the Obama administration seems to have
superimposed an odd veneer on this authority: the concept of self-defense targeting. 1O Invoking the inherent right of self-defense, this theory suggests that both the
resort to armed fo rce and the execution of specific operations are regulated by the
jllS ad bellutn. In essence, because attacking terrorist targets falls within the scope
of internatio nal self-defense legal authority, jus ad bellutn self-defense principles
regulate the execution of combat operations used to achieve this self-defense objective, obviating the need to assess whether and what jus in bello principles apply
to these o perations. Thus, so long as the targets fall within the ad bellutn principles
of necessity and proportionality, attacking them is legally pennissible.
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II. Background
There is nothing un usual about the assertion that the principles of necessity and
proportionality regulate combat operations directed against transnational terrorist
operatives.l l What is unusual is the assertion that jus ad bellum variants of these
principles regulate operational execution.12 Necessity and p roportionality have
always been core principles of both branches of the jus belli-principles that apply
to both the authority to employ m ilitary force and the regulation of actual employment . However, in the jus ad bellum context, they have never before been viewed as
principles to regulate operational and tactical execution. 13 Instead, in that context
they frame the legality of national or multinational resort to m ilitary force in selfdefense. Once the decision is made to em ploy force pursuant to this authority, the
jus in bello variant of these principles (necessity of the mission and proportionality
of collateral damage) operate to regulate the application of combat power d uring
mission execut ion (in other words, they provide the foundatio n fo r the regulation
of the application of combat power in the context of the self-defense-justified
mission).
This self- defense targeting paradigm-Professor Kenneth Anderson's " naked
self-defense"I~-is certainly responsive to concerns over the legality of extending
counterterror combat operations beyond the geographic limits of Afghanistan
(and to an increasingly lesser degree Iraq). However, it does not and cannot become a substitute for defining the rules that regulate the actual execution of such
missions. This ad bellum targeting theory may in some ways be responsive to the
uncertainty related to the legal characterization of the struggle against transnational terrorism, o r perhaps more precisely the question of whether an armed conflict can exist within the meaning of international law when States employ armed
force to find, fix and destroy terrorist operations in diverse geographic locations.15
A subcomponent of this question regarding the existence of an armed conflict is,
even assuming the answer is yes, does such a conflict follow the enemy wherever on
the globe he may be and does it provide for a "springing" of the LOAC authority for
brief periods of time wherever he is located?
Since the United States initiated its m ilitary response to the terrorist attacks of
September I I, 200 1, the uncertainty related to the legal nature of this response has
been a central theme in policy and academic discourse. Although the answers to
these questions seem increasingly settled in U.S. practice (at least in the practical if
not legal sense), q uestions over the legality of killing OBL--or the availability of
viable alternatives-have again highlighted the significance of this uncertainty.
While the United States seems to have abandoned the assertion that it is in a "war"
against terror that spans the entire globe, its continued attack of what can only be
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understood as targets of opportunity in places like Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan
have kept this uncertainty at the forefront of contemporary debate on counterterror operations. 16
Various interpretations of what triggers the jus in bello emerged follow ing the
U.S. military response to the terror attacks of September II. In general terms, these
theories ranged across a spectrum from a strict adherence to the theretofore widely
accepted internationaVinternal armed conflict paradigm, to the other extreme,
proffered by me and others, that military operations conducted against international terrorist organizations like al Qaeda should be characterized as transnational
armed confli cts: non-international armed conflicts of international scope. 17
Within that range were included concepts such as militarized law enforcement and
extraterritorial law enforcement (military operations within the framework ofhuman rights principles). All of these approaches shared a common theme: they
sought to define the rules of tactical execution applicable to this military response
within a framework of established legal norms. 18
This essay will argue that the concept of self-defense targeting does not and cannot provide a substitute for resolving the debate about in bello applicability to
transnational counterterror military operations. The reasons for this are multifaceted. First, the jus ad bellum has never been understood as a source of operational
or tactical regulation nor a substitute for the law providing that regulation. 19
Indeed, one of the central tenets of the jus belli has always been the invalidity of reliance on the jus ad bellum to define jus in bello obligations. Instead, the de facto nature of tactical execution is the principal factor for assessing applicability of the jus
in bello. Second, because the jus ad bellum has never been conceived as a tactical
regulatory framework, using it as a substitute for the jus in bello injects unacceptable confusion into the planning and execution of combat operations. Finally,
while the principles of necessity and proportionality are central to both branches of
the jus belli, the meaning of these principles is not identical in each branch but, in
fact, disparate. As a result, the scope of lawful authority to employ force during
mission execution will be subtly but unquestionably degraded if ad bellum principles are utilized as a substitute for in bello regulation.
A. Transnational Armed Conflict: Genesis and Controversy
Transnational anned conflict as a legal term of art was nonexistent prior to September II , 2001. Other writings provide extensive explanation of the term's origins
and the concept it proposed. 20 In essence, it was a concept intended to bridge the
chasm between the two traditionally acknowledged-and ostensibly only-situations triggering the jus in bello: international or inter-State armed conflicts and
non -international or internal armed conflicts.21 Adopted in the 1949 revisions to
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the Geneva Conventions, the concept of armed conflict, and these two categories of
armed conflict, manifested an effort to ensure a genuine de facto law-triggering
standard. 22 While this did not eliminate all uncertainty as to when the law applies,
preventing h umanitarian law avoidance through reliance on technical legal concepts such as war was unquestionably the primary motive behind the adoption of
the armed conflict law trigger.
This was a profound development in conflict regulation. For the first time in
history, a treaty-based legal test dictated applicability of LOAC regulation. 23 Although originally linked only to application of the Geneva Conventions, these triggers rapidly became the standard for applicability of the entire corpus of the
LOAC. 24 An entire generation of military and international lawyers learned that
armed conflict triggers LOAC application.2s However, they also learned that there
were only two types of armed conflict: international and internaP6
This dichotomy was under-inclusive from its inception. The international!
internal armed conflict dichotomy was dearly responsive to the law avoidance
that occurred during World War II and the law inapplicability during the Spanish
Civil WarP However, it failed to account for the possibility of extraterritorial
armed conflicts between States and non-State belligerents.28 Although not a common situation in the history of modern warfare, hostilities in such a context were
not unknown. 29 Nor did the armed-conflict-law trigger account for the emergence
of other external military operations involving minimal hostilities, such as United
Nations peacekeeping missions. JO Understanding the necessity of providing a regulatory framework for such operations, commanders and legal advisors thrust
into these zones of uncertainty resorted to policy-based application of jus in bello
principles, a methodology that proved generally effective in the decade preceding
9/1 l. l1 However, this approach to ftIling the regulatory void created by the international/internal dichotomy also averted attention from the underlying issue of
regulatory under-ind usiveness. l2
This under-inclusiveness was fully exposed when the United States initiated its
military response toal Qaeda following the terror attacks of September II }3 As the
United States began to preventively detain captives in that struggle, the implicit invocation of LOAC authority became clear. 14 Use of the designation "unlawful
combatant" confirmed this invocation-these terrorist operatives were detained
not as criminals awaiting adjudication, but as enemy operatives to prevent their return to hostilities}S However, pursuant to the advice provided by his Attorney
General, President Bush concluded that LOAC protections were inapplicable to
these detainees.)6 The basis for this conclusion was d ear: the armed conflict with al
Qaeda did not fit within the international/internal armed conflict law-triggering
equation.l1 Because al Qaeda was not a State, the conflict could not qualify as
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international; because al Qaeda operated outside the territory of the United States,
the conflict could not qualify as internal.l8
This determination was problematic on numerous levels, but for military
lawyers trained to ensure compliance with LOAC principles during all military operations no matter how they might be legally classified,39 it was particularly troubling. As I have written previously, the concept of transnational armed conflict
evolved to respond to this newly exploited gap in legal protections for individuals
subjected to LOAC-based authority.40 The objectives of the concept were simple:
adopt a characterization for the non-international anned conflict with al Qaeda
consistent with the non-State but nonetheless international character of the organization; require application offundamental LOAC principles; and deny al Qaeda
any credibility windfall from suggesting the conflict was international within the
meaning of the law. In short, it was simply a term to denote a non-international
armed conflict (within the meaning of Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions) of international scope, what others have called an "internationalized non-international armed conflict."4l
Reaction to the transnational armed conflict concept has ranged the spectrum
from rejection42 to endorsement;H however, it is important to note that the underlying objective is also reflected in other conceptions of the legal framework for
the military component of counterterror operations. As noted, these include "internationalized" non-international armed conflict and militarized extraterritorial
law enforcement.44 For the United States, this debate was essentially resolved by
the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.45 A majority of the
Court concluded the tenn "non-international anned conflict" in Common Article 3 is not restricted to internal armed conflicts, but covers any armed conflict
that does not qualify as international within the meaning of Common Article 2.46
This "co ntradistinction" interpretation effectively achieved the transnational
armed conflict objective: a majority of the Court closed the gap identi fied (some
might say exploited) by the Department of Justice analysis and relied on by President Bush.47 By concluding that any armed conflict that fails to qualify as "international" within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions is non -international
(irrespective of geographic scope) and therefore triggers the baseline humanitarian protections of Common Article 3, the Court created a simple equation: if the
government treats the struggle against al Qaeda as an armed conflict, it must be either international or non -international within the meaning of the Geneva
Conventions. 48 Thus, it closed the gap in humanitarian law applicability and ensured that future invocations of armed conflict authority must trigger minimum
humanitarian obligations ..f9
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The Hamdan opinion has not, however, eliminated the uncertainty and controversy over the legal characterization of military operations directed against al
Qaeda. 50 Experts continue to struggle with this question, and new theories continue
to emerge.51 It remains indisputable, however, that characterizing the contention
between al Qaeda and the United States as an armed conflict defies indicators traditionally applied to identify the existence of non-international armed conflicts.52
Those most notably lacking include a sustained nature of combat operations directed against al Qaeda targets outside the Afghanistan zone of combat 53 (even
loosely defined ), and the lack of continuous and concerted hostilities by al Qaeda
against the United States.54 This lack of "intensity" and "duration" was in fact central to the conclusion by a working group of the International Law Commission
that counterterror operations cannot be properly characterized as armed conflicts,
even of the non-international type.55 Following President Obama's election, expectations were high that the new administration might abandon the armed conflict theory altogether and revert to the international law enforcement approach to
dealing with the transnational terrorist threat. 56 Not only were these expectations
unfounded; the new administration opened an entirely new front in the legal characterization debate.5'
B. Self-defen se Targeting: A Third Rail?
It did not take long for the Obama administration to demonstrate that it was not
about to abandon an armed conflict-based approach to dealing with the al Qaeda
threat.58 To this date, the United States continues to employ combat power against
al Qaeda operatives in locations both proximate to and far removed from ongoing
hostilities in Afghanistan. 59 These operations involve the employment of deadly
force as a measure of first resort, an unavoidable indicator that the United States
continues to rely on an armed conflict-based legal framework. 60 The discomfort
with such an expansive concept of armed conflict is certainly understandable.
What is equally understandable is the pragmatic reality that the nature of these
operations makes them inconsistent with peacetime law enforcement legal principles. 61 Nonetheless, the apparent aversion to recognizing some type of "springing"
armed conflict paradigm has produced not only opposition, but also a proposal
for an alternative legal framework that avoids the need to address the conflict classification dilemma: self-defense targeting.62
This alternative methodology is most notably attributed to Professor Kenneth
Anderson. 63 In a series of essays, Anderson began to proffer the argwnent that the
jus ad bellum provides sufficient-and ostensibly exclusive-legal authority for
the regulation of attacks directed against terrorist operatives.64 This theory has
also been embraced by Professor Jordan Paust.65 Although Paust has consistently
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rejected characterizing the response to transnational terrorism as an armed conflict66 (based primarily on a classical interpretation of Common Articles 2 and 3 of
the Geneva Conventions)/,7 his position has evolved to acknowledge the legitimate use of military force in self-defense against external non -State threats.68 That
response would not qualify as an armed conflict, because it could not fit within the
traditionally understood scope of the Geneva Convention law-triggering framework. Instead, the jus ad bellum right of self-defense would be the exclusive source
of legal authority related to the response.
Professor Anderson characterizes this theory as "naked self-defense."69 According to Anderson, this term characterizes the legal basis for drone strikes articulated
by State Departmen t Legal Advisor Harold Koh: exercise of jus ad bellum selfdefense does not ipso facto trigger the jus in bello. As will be explained more fully
be1ow, in the same essay Anderson signals a significant revision of this theory-a
retreat motivated by his reflection on the inability to effectively define the geographic scope of a transnational non -international armed conflict. What issignificant here, however, is that the thcory itself presents a complex question: is it
possible to employ military force pursuant to a claim of jus ad bellum national selfdefense without triggering the jus in bello? And if the answer is yes, what international legal principles regulate the application of combat power during the execution of such operations?
In this essay, I argue that jus ad bellum targeting-Qr naked self-defense-is a
flawed substitute fo r embracing the alternate (albeit controversial) conclusion that
employing combat power in self-de fense against transnational non-State operatives must be characterized as armed conflict. In support of this argument, the essay will expose what I believe is the implicit acknowledgment by proponents of
self-defense targeting that these operations do indeed trigger the LOAC. I will do
this by exploring the nature of two fundamen tal jus belli principles invoked by
these proponents: necessity and proportionality.70 Contrasting the effect of these
principles within the self-defense targeting framework with their effect within a jus
in bello framework will illustrate that self-defense targeting reflects an implicit acknowledgment of jus in bello applicability during operational mission execution.

Ill. Th e Traditiona l Distinction between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello
At the core of the self-defense targeting theory is the assumption that the jus ad
bellum provides sufficient authority to both justify and regulate the application of
combat power.7 1 This assumption ignores an axiom of jus belli development: the
compartmentalization of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.72 As Colonel
G.I.A.D. Draper noted in 1971, "equal application of the Law governing the

64

Geoffrey S. Com

conduct of armed conflicts to those illegally resorting to armed forces and those
lawfully resorting thereto is accepted as axiomatic in modern International Law. "73
This compartmentalization is the historic response to the practice of definingjus in
bello obligations by reference to the jus ad bellum legality of conflict. 74 As the jus in
bello evolved to focus on the humanitarian protection of victims of war, to include
the armed forces themselves,75 the practice of denying LOAC applicability based on
assertions of conflict illegality became indefensible. 76 Instead, the de fac to nature of
hostilities would dictate jus in bello applicability, and the jus ad bellum legal basis
for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination. 77
This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention lawtriggering equation.78 Adoption of the term "armed conflict" as the primary triggering consideration for jus in bello applicability was a deliberate response to the
more formalistic jus i" bello applicability that predated the 1949 revision of the
Geneva Conventions.19 Prior to these revisions, in bello applicability often turned
on the existence of a state of war in the international legal sense, which in turn led
to assertions of inapplicability as the result of assertions of unlawful aggression.SO
Determined to prevent the denial of humanitarian regulation to situations necessitating such regulation-any de facto armed conflict-the 1949 Conventions
sought to neutralize the impact of ad bellum legality in law applicability analysis.81
This effort rapidly became the norm of internationallaw.82 Armed conflict analysis simply did not include conflict legality considerations.83 National military
manuals, international jurisprudence and expert commentary all reflect this development. SoI This division is today a fundamental LOAC tenet-and is beyond dispute.85 In fact, for many years the United States has gone even farther, extending
application of LOAC principles beyond situations of armed conflict altogether so
as to regulate any military operation.86 This is just another manifestation of the fact
that States, or perhaps more importantly the armed forces that do their bidding,
view the cause or purported justification for such operations as irrelevant when deciding what rules apply to regulate operational and tactical execution.
This aspect of ad bellumlin bello compartmentalization is not called into question by the self-defense targeting concept.8' Nothing in the assertion that combat
operations directed against transnational non-State belligerent groups qualifies as
armed conflict suggests the inapplicability ofLOAC regulatory norms on the basis
of the relative illegitimacy of al Qaeda'sefforts to inflict harm on the United States
and other victim States (although as noted earlier, this was implicit in the original
Bush administration approach to the war on terror).88 Instead, the self-defense targeting concept reflects an odd inversion of the concern that motivated the armed
conflict law trigger. The concept does not assert the illegitimacy of the terrorist
cause to deny LOAC principles to operations directed against them. 89 Instead, it
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relies on the legality of the U.S. cause to dispense with the need for applying LOAC
principles to regulate these operations. 90 This might not be explicit, but it is clear
that an exclusive focus on ad bellum principles indicates that these principles subsume in bello conflict regulation norms.91
There are two fundamental flaws with this conflation. First, by contradicting the
traditional compartmentalization between the two branches of the jus belli,92 it creates a dangerous precedent. Although there is no express resurrection of the just
war concept ofLOAC applicability, by focusing exclusively on jus ad bellum legality
and principles, the concept suggests the inapplicability of jus hi bello regulation as
the result of the legality of the U.S. cause. To be clear, I believe U.S. counterterror
operations are legally justified actions in self-defense. However, this should not be
even implicitly relied on to deny jus in bello applicability to operations directed
against terrorist opponents, precisely because it may be viewed as suggesting the
invalidity of the opponent's cause deprives them of the protections of that law, or
that the operations are somehow exempted from LOAC regulation. Second, even
discounting this detrimental precedential effect, the conOation of ad bellum and in
bello principles to regulate the execution of operations is extremely troubling.'B
This is because the meaning of these principles is distinct within each branch of the

jus beUi.'l4
Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum principles purported1y invoked to regulate operational execution is more restrictive
than that derived from their jus in bello counterparts,9S this conflation produces a
potential windfall for terrorist operatives. Thus, the ad bellumJin bello conflation
is ironically self-contradictory. In one sense, it suggests the inapplicability of jus
in bello protections to the illegitimate terrorist enemy because of the legitimacy of
the U.S. cause.96 In another sense, the more restrictive nature of the jus ad bellum
principles it substitutes for the jus in bello variants to regulate operational execution provides the enemy with increased protection from attack. 97 Neither of these
consequences is beneficial, nor necessary. Instead, compliance with the traditional jus ad bellum/jus in bello compartmentalization methodology averts these
consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict
regulation. 98

IV. Necessity and Proportionality: The Risk ofAuthority Dilution
The most problematic aspect of the self-defense targeting concept is that it produces a not so subtle substitution ofjllS ad bellum necessity and proportionality for
the jus in bello variants of these principles. 99 While these principles are fundamental in both branches of the jus belli, 100 they are not identical in effect. The ad bellum
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variants are intended to limit State resort to force to a measure of last resort;IOI the
in bello variants are intended to strike an appropriate balance between the authority to efficiently bring about the submission of an enemy and the humanitarian interest of limiting the inevitable suffering associated with armed conflict. 102
It is a fo undational principle of international law that the jus ad bellum restricts
resort to force by States to situations of absolute necessity-and necessity justifies
only proportional force to return the status quo ante. 103 In this sense, national
self-defense is strikingly analogous to individual self-defense as a criminal law
justification. H14 In both contexts, necessity requires a determination of an imminent threat of unlawful attack, a situation affording no alternative other than selfhelp measures. lOS Furthennore, even when the justification of self-help is triggered by an imminent threat, both bodies of law strictly limit the amount offorce
that may be employed to respond to the threat.l06 States, like individuals, may use
only that amount of force absolutely necessary to meet the threat and restore the
status quo ante of security. to? Using more force than is necessary to subdue the
threat is considered excessive, and therefore outside the realm of the legally justified response.108
There is no question that these variants of necessity and proportionality are critical to the stability of international relations. 109 The UN Charter reflects an obvious
judgment that States are obligated to endeavor to resolve all disputes peacefully,
and that resort to force must be conceived as an exceptional measure. 110 A very limited conception of necessity requiring an actual and imminent threat of unlawful
aggression selVes this purpose by prioritizing alternate dispute resolution modalities over uses offorce-the core purpose of the Charter. III Even after a justifiable
resort to fo rce, the requirement to provide notice to the Security Councll l12 reflects
this purpose by enhancing the probability of Security Council action to restore international peace and security and thereby nullify the necessity for continued use
of force by the State. lu The jus ad bellum proportionality rule also selVes this purpose by reducing the risk of uncontrollable escalation. 114 By limiting the justified
response to only that amount of force absolutely necessary to reduce the threat,
proportionality operates to mitigate the risk of a justified self-defense response
morphing into an unjustified use of military force to achieve objectives unrelated
to self-defense. lIS As a result, conflagration is limited, thereby enhancing the efficacy of alternate dispute resolution modalities.
These principles make perfect sense when assessing the justification for a national resort to military force outside the umbrella of a Security Council authorization. However, as operational execution parameters, they impose a peacetime selfdefense model onto wartime employment of combat power. This is because the jus
in bello variants of necessity and proportionality have never been understood to
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function analogously with their peacetime variants.1I6 Instead, these principles
have unique meaning in the context of armed conflict.117 As a result, they are simply not interchangeable with the ad bellum variants. As a result, the self-defense targeting concept ostensibly regulates the execution of combat operations with norms
inconsistent with those historically and logically suited for that purpose.
Jus in bello necessity means something fundamentally different than self-defense
necessity.118 In the context of armed conflict, necessity justifies a much broader exercise of authority-the authority to employ all measures not otherwise prohibited
by international law to bring about the prompt submission of the enemy. 119 Unlike
self-defense necessity, there is no "measure oflast resort" aspect to jus in bello necessity.12o Accordingly, armed conflict triggers authority to employ force in a
manner that would rarely (if ever) be tolerated in peacetime, even when acting in
self-defense. 121
The most obvious (and relevant for purposes of this essay) illustration of the difference between ad bellum and in bello necessity is the authority to employ deadly
force against an opponent. Like peacetime self-defense, jus ad bellum self-defense
justifies a State's use of deadly military force only as a measure oflast resort. 122 In
contrast, jus in bello necessity authorizes the use of deadly combat power against an
enemy as a measure of first resort. This necessity justification is implemented
through the rule of military objective, which establishes who and what qualify as a
lawful object of attack. 123 However, once that status is determined, it is the principle of military necessity124 that justifies employment of deadly combat power
against such "targets" as a measure of first resort. us
It is d ear that this authority in no way requires manifestation of actual threat to
the attacking force. 126 Instead, the status of military objective alone results in a presumption of threat that justifies the use of deadly force. 117 This preswnption itself
indicates the unique function of in bello necessity. This central premise of the jus in
bello was reflected as early as Rousseau's 1762 Contract social, in which he noted
that "[wJar is not a relation between man and man, but a relation between State
and State in which individuals are enemies only incidentally, not as men, or citizens, but as soldiers."1l8
Because armed conflict involves a contest between armed belligerent groups,
and not merely individual actors, the use of force authority triggered by military
necessity is focused on collective rather than individual effect. l29 In other words,
unlike a peacetime exercise of necessity (which focuses on neutralizing an individual threat), wartime l30 necessity focuses on bringing about the submission of the
enemy in the corporate and not individual sense.])1 This collective vice individual
focus of justifiable violence applies at every level of military operations. At the
strategic level, nations seek to break the will of an opponent by demonstrating to
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enemy leadership the futility of resistance; at the operational level, commanders
seek to impose their will on forces arrayed against them by the synchronized employment of all combat capabilities.132 The ideal outcome of such employment is
the establishment offull-spectrum dominance, allowing the friendly commander
to impose his will on the enemy at the time and place of his choosing. m This routinely necessitates use of overwhelming combat power at the decisive point in the
battle--use that is often far more robust than may be required to overcome resistance at that specific point. l:J4 At the tactical level, forces may use mass and shock
to paralyze enem y forces, disrupt their ability to maneuver and adjust to the fluidity of the battle, and demoralize individual unit members. us All of these effects
contribute to "the prompt submission of the enemy."I)!;
Employing overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time of battle
(known as the principle of mass in the lexicon of military doctrine)l 31 would arguably be inconsistent with jus ad bellum necessity.OS Instead, a commander would
be restricted from employing any amount offorce beyond what was actually necessary to subdue the individual object of attack. 139 Thus, the assertion that the jus ad
bellum suffices to justify necessary measures to subdue an opponent misses the
point. The question is not whether the resort to force by the State is necessary-a
question that certainly must be answered through the lens of jus ad bellum necessity.14o The question is whether the amount of force then employed by the armed
forces of the State to subdue the enemy is justified, a question that must be answered through the lens of a vel)' different conception of necessity.141
Even more problematic than the extension of jus ad bellum necessity as an operational regulatory norm is the extension of jus ad bellum proportionality. Like
necessity, proportionality is a core principle of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in
bello. 14 2 And like necessity, the principle has a significantly different meaning in
each branch of the jus belli. 143 Conflating these disparate principles into a singular
regulatol)' norm substantially degrades the scope oflawful targeting authority and
confuses those charged with executing combat operations.
In the jus ad bellum, proportionality really means proportionality. This might
seem like an odd statement, but it is critical when comparing the two jus belli variants
of the principle. Proportionality normally means no more than is absolutely necessary to achieve a valid purpose. 144 It is a concept that is normally linked to a justification of necessity. 145 Similarly, under U.S. criminal law, actions in self-defense
are invalid if executed with more force than is necessary to reduce the threat. Use
of excessive force in that context, because not strictly necessary, is unjustified. 146
The jus ad bellum reflects an analogous conception of proportionality .147 First, the
amount of force a State is permitted to employ in self-defense is strictly limited
to that amount necessary to reduce the imminent threat.148 Second, the source of
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aggression is the beneficiary of the proportionality constraint. 149 In other words,
as in the criminal law context, a State (like an individual) responding to unlawful
aggression may be authorized to employ force in self-defense, but is prohibited
from responding to the source of aggression with any amount of force in excess of
that necessary to reduce that immediate threat.
In contrast, proportionality in the jus in bello context does not really mean proportionality. Again, this may seem like an odd proposition. Nonetheless, even a
cursory review of the jus in hello proportionality principle validates this conclusion.
First, unlike traditional proportionality, the jus in hello variant in no way protC<ts
the object of deliberate violence (the lawful target). Instead, the beneficiaries of
the protection are the knowing but non-deliberate victims of a deliberate attackcivilians and civilian property in proximity to the lawful target. lSO Protecting these
potential victims from what is referred to in colloquial terms as collateral damage
and incidental injury reflects a fundamentally different purpose for this proportionality constraint. Unlike in the self-defense context, jus in bello proportionality
is not directly linked to the necessity of subduing an imminent threat. Instead, the
objective of the principle is to protect innocent people and property in the vicinity
of a lawful object of attack from the consequences of employing combat power
against lawful targets. As for the lawful target itself, the suggestion that an attack
might be disproportionate is a legal oxymoron; the status alone justifies that
amount of force determined necessary to bring about enemy submission, which
justifies use of deadly force as a measure of first resort. 151 The only limitation on
that use of force is the prohibition against the use of methods (tactics) or means
(weapons ) calculated or of a nature to cause superfl uous injury or unnecessary
suffering. However, this rule is not synonymous with the protections provided by
the principle of proportionality, and rarely is considered a limitation on the employment of authorized weapon systems against enemy personnel, facilities or
equipment.
Second, beneficiaries of jus in bello proportionality (potential victims of collateral damage and incidental injury) are not protected from disproportionate effects,
but from excessive effects. IS! An attack is unlawful within the meaning of jus in
bello proportionality only when the knowing but non-deliberate harm will be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. While the principle, like its
ad bellum counterpart, does trigger a balance of interests, the fulcrum upon which
that balance is made is fundamentally different. Excessive is not, nor ever has been,
analogous to disproportionate. ls3 To begin with, the meaning of the word is far
more elusive than that of traditional proportionality. Proportionality connotes
something slightly more than necessary to produce an outcome. While this is not a
precise concept, it lends itself to objective evaluation. Indeed, juries sitting in
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judgment of defendants claiming the justifi cation of self- defense routinely critique
the amount of force employed by the defendant, asking whether it was more than
necessary to respond to the threat.
Excessive, in contrast, connotes a significant imbalance. While the precise
meaning of excessive collateral damage or incidental injury remains nearly as elusive
today as it was when the concept was incorporated into Additional Protocol I, ISo! one
thing is dear: it is not analogous to disproportionate harm as the term is used in relation to traditional proportionality analysis. Instead, it means something more
analogous to harm so overwhelming that it actually nullifies the legitimacy of attacking an othernrise lawful target. Thus, the jus in bello proportionality principle
does not obligate commanders to strictly limit the amount of fo rce employed
against a lawful target to the absolute minimum necessary to eliminate a threat.
Instead, it obligates the commander to cancel an attack only when the anticipated
harm to civilians andJor civilian property is so beyond the realm of reason that infli cting that harm, even incidentally, reflects a total disregard fo r the innocent victims of hostilities. ISS In this sense, it is almost as if the law imputes an illicit state of
mind to a commander because of the disregard of the risk of overwhelming harm
to the civilian population .lS6
This jus in bello variant of proportionality is further distinguished from its ad
bellum counterpart because of the nature of operational and tactical targeting. In a
traditional self-defense context, the employment of force (individually or nationally) is justified for the sole purpose of eliminating the imminent threat. In armed
conflict, the potential effect to be achieved by employing combat power against a
lawful target often varies depending on mission requirements. Accordingly, elimination of an individual threat is not the unitary objective offorce employment. Instead, commanders leverage their combat power to achieve defin ed effects against
the range of enemy targets in the battlespace, effects that collectively facilitate enemy
submission.ls7 Destruction is obviously one of these effects. However, doctrinal effects also include disruption, degradation, interdiction, suppression and harassment.lss Each of these effects requires a different type and amount of fo rce to
achieve; and each effect therefore implicates a very different proportionality
analysis.
This variable nature of justifiable effects in anned conflict-known in operational terms as "effects-based operations"159-is a critical factor in applying the jus
in bello proportionality principle, and finds no analogue in self-defense targeting.
Nations employ force to reduce the threat, and only that amount offorce required
to do so is justified . Accordingly, if disruption alone is sufficient to restore the nonthreat environment, the jus ad bellum obligates the State to employ force limited in
intensity to achieve this effect. However, no analogous minimum necessary force
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obligation exists pursuant to the jus in bello proportionality principle. Instead, each
employment of force is operationally connected to the broader overall objective of
compelling enemy submission. Thus, disruption and bypass of enemy fo rces may
be a selected course of action at one point in the battle, while total destruction may
be selected for a similar enemy force at another point in the battle. Obviously, these
different selected effects will drive the amount of force employment required,
which will in turn influence the risk of collateral damage and incidental injUll'.
Furthermore, under the ad bellum construct, proportionality is traditionally assessed at the strategic (macro) level. 160
The importance of this aspect of jus in bello proportionality is reflected in the
requirement that the consequences of force employment be assessed against the
overall operational objective, and not the individual tactical objective. A number of
States included this macro conception of proportionality in understandings when
they ratified Additional Protocol I. 161 The motivation to enter such reservations
seems obvious: attribution of the value of employing combat power in armed conflict for purposes of balancing the anticipated effects of that employment against
collateral damage and incidental injury must be framed by the broader concept of
how it contributes to the legitimate operational objective of compelling enemy
submission, not through a micro assessment of whether it is sufficient to achieve
any given and isolated tactical objective. This aspect of jus in bello proportionality
once again reflects the most fundamental difference between the two variants of
the principle: the beneficiary of the protection is not the object of attack.
Collectively, all of these considerations indicate that extending jus ad bellum
proportionality to jus in bello decision making produces at worst a significant distortion oflegitimate operational authority, and at best confusion as to the scope of
targeting authority. Are forces executing jus ad bellum self-defense missions obligated to employ minim um force to subdue the object of attack? Is the object of attack protected by the principle? Must proportionality be assessed based on an
exclusive consideration of reducing the threat presented by the immediate object
of attack, or may the broader impact on enemy fo rces be considered? These questions are nullified by maintaining the traditional division between jus ad bellum
authority and jus in bello regulation. Pursuant to this division, the nation acts in response to an actual or imminent threat and the armed forces executing operations
pursuant to that justificatiml employ force in order to bring about the prompt submission of the enemy entity posing the threat. In so doing, they balance the risk of
collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians and civilian property in the vicinity of enemy objects of attack. But nothing obligates them to employ the minimum amount of force to achieve each individual tactical objective.
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v. If It Ain't Broke Don't Fix It: Jus in Bello Principles and Tactical Clarity
As noted earlier in this essay, some commentators continue to assert the inapplicability of jus in bello principles to the struggle against transnational terrorism on the
basis that this struggle cannot qualify as armed conflict, or that if it does it is geographically restricted to zones of traditional combat operations.162 Some of these
commentators also reject the legitimacy of invoking jus ad bellum self-de fense to
attack terrorists. This rejection at least renders their position logically consistent.
The same cannot be said for advocates of self-defense targeting: those who assert
the legitimacy ofinvoking the right of national self-defense to respond to the threat
of transnational terrorism, but insist such operations cannot normally qualify as
armed conflicts triggering the jus in bello. 163 If, as they assert, responding to terrorism with military force is justified pursuant to the jus ad bellum, then the use of
combat capability to execute such missions is, in the view of this author and others,
sufficient to qualify as armed conflict. Why is there such aversion to acknowledging
jus in bello applicability to military operations executed to achieve these legitimate
self-defense objectives? The most obvious answer appears to be the conclusion that
these operations, while justified as actions in self-defense, fail to satisfy the internationally accepted elements to qualify as armed conflicts. l64
This self-defense-without-armed-conflict approach reflects a visceral discomfort with the suggestion that States may properly invoke jus in bello authority
whenever they choose to employ combat power abroad. Transnational armed conflict opponents argue that since the inception of the "Global War on Terror,» unless combat operations fit within the traditional Geneva Convention internationaV
internal armed conflict equation, they cannot be characterized as armed conllicts.16S
Others (including the author) have responded to this argument at length in previous articles. 166 However, what is perplexing is that this argument loses all merit
when connected with the self-defense targeting theory. That theory presupposes
the use of combat power to defend the nation against an imminent and ongoing
threat posed by transnational terrorist operatives.
If this is the basis for refusing to acknowledge the applicab ility of jus in bello
regulatio n, it is the ultimate manifestation of willful blindn ess. Essentially, selfdefense targeting proponents implicitly acknowledge operations conducted under
this authority involve anned hostilities against transnational non-State threats.
However, they then avoid assessing the nat ure of these hostilities, and how they
implicate jus in bello applicability, by substituting ad bellum principles to provide a
regulatory framework for operational execution.167
Professor Kenneth Anderson's latest essay on this subject is particularly insightful on the validity of the self-defense targeting concept. l68 An (or perhaps the)
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original proponent of self-defense targeting,l69 Anderson candidly acknowledges
his reversal on this issue, and that what he calls "naked self-defense" is insufficient
to provide comprehensive regulation to transnational counterterroroperations. 170
This is an important step in the right direction, for it will better focus debate on the
underlying and critical question of whether a nation's resort to force in self-defense
against an external non-State opponent can qualify as something other than armed
conflict. My response to this question has been consistent: when a State employs
combat power in a manner that indicates it has implicitly invoked LOAC principles
(by employing deadly force as a measure of first resort), it is engaged in an armed
conflict. As a reswt, it is bound to comply with core LOAC principles. 111 This does
not mean that any use of armed forces qualifies as armed conflict. Such a view
would certainly be overbroad, and I have argued against this approach consistently
in the past. However, when armed forces employed to achieve a national security
objective conduct operations pursuant to LOAC-based targeting authority-statusbased targeting-that combination of armed forces and engagement authority indicates they are utilizing the "tools" of war, and must respect, at a minimum, the
core principles of the "rwes" of war. 172
Irrespective of the relative support for or opposition to this interpretation of
LOAC applicability, it remains a critical question that has been obscured by the
self-defense targeting alternative. If, as propo nents like Professor Paust argue, an
exercise of national self-defense against transnational non-State threats is not
armed conflict, focus must be redirected to determine the alternative controlling
legal framework for regwating the execution of such operations. Can national selfdefense be executed with an employment of military (or paramilitary) force falling
below the threshold of armed conflict? For example, are there situations where a
State when asserting the right of national self-defense is obligated by the jus ad bellum
proportionality requirement to rely on police powers instead of combat power?
This seems a particularly critical question in an era of transnational non-State
threats. Terrorism is obviously first on that list (at least for the United States), but
organized criminal syndicates operating across national boundaries, piracy and
non-State-generated cyber threats all share similarities with transnational terrorism. All of these threats challenge the national security of multiple States; all of
these threats emanate from entities that are rarely organized in traditional military
character; all of these threats may compe1 reliance on military force in response.
Yet in the view of many, the lack of organization, territorial control and concerted
military-type operations by these threats exclude responses (even with military
force ) from the category of armed conflict. m
Invoking the jus ad bellum as a justification to respond to such threats is insufficient to resolve this important question. Instead, resolving this question requires a
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careful assessment of the nature of the threat, the nature of the requisite response
and the very real consequences of subjecting operational execution to either a law
enforcement or armed conflict legal framework. Some experts (the author included) continue to believe that LOAC principles provide an effective and operationally logical framework to regulate any combat operation . But as noted above,
this view is based on the conclusion that the key trigger for application of these
principles is a use of force that reflects reliance on the principle of military objective. In those situations, there is arguably no value-and indeed substantial riskin attempting to substitute jus ad bellum principles to regulate operational execution. However, there are plausible arguments that the nature of some self-defense
missions might justify a more restrictive operational framework based on a hybrid
of LOAC and law enforceme nt p rinciples.1 7~ What seems clear, however, is that
even if true, these principles would be applied as the result of the nature of the
threat/response continuum, not as an extension of jus ad bellum principles to regulate operational execution.

VI. One Step Forward, One Step Back: A re We Missing Something?
The statement by Legal Advisor Koh following the Bin Laden raid addressing U.S.
legal authority for the mission and for killing Bin Laden is perhaps as clear an articulation of a legal basis for a military action ever provided by the Department of
State. 17S Indeed, the fact that Koh articulated an official U.S. interpretation of both
the jus ad bellum and jus in bello makes his use of a website titled Opinio /uris 176 especially significant (as such a statement by a government official in Koh's position
is clear evidence of opinio juris). Unlike his earlier statement at a meeting of the
American Society of International Law, m Koh did not restrict his invocation of
law to the jus ad bellum. Instead, he asserted the U.S. position that the mission was
justified pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense, but also that Bin Laden's
killing was lawful pursuant to the jus in bello. Koh properly noted that as a mission
executed in the context of the armed conflict with al Qaeda, the LOAC imposed no
obligation on U.S. fo rces to employ minimum necessary force. Instead, Bin
Laden's status as an enemy belligerent justified the use of deadly force as a measure
of first resort, and Bin Laden bore the burden of manifesting his surrender in order
to terminate that authority. Hence, U.S. forces were in no way obligated to attempt
to capture Bin Laden before resorting to deadly forceYs
A recent statement made by lohn Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, further clarifies the current administration's justification for using deadly fo rce as a first resort against al Qaeda
operatives:
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The United States does not view our authority to use military fo rce against al-Qa'ida as
being restricted solely to ~ hot" battlefields like Afghanistan. Because we are engaged in
an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida, the United States takes the legal position that . . . we
have the authority to take action against al-Qa'ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-defense analysis each time....
This Administration's counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are
focused on those individuals who are a threat to the United States, whose removal
would cause a significant--even if only temporary--disruption of the plans and capabilities of al-Qa'ida and its associated fo rces. Practically speaking, then, the question
turns principally on how you defme "imminence."
We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more
flexible understanding of ~ imminence" may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist
groups, in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves in
the ways that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts . . . . Over time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism partners have begun to recognize that the traditional conception of what constitutes an "imminent" attack should
be broadened in light of the modem-day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations of terrorist organizations. l79
These two articulations of the Obama administration's interpretation of intem ationallaw reflect an important evolution of the U.S. legal framework for military
operat ions directed against transnational terrorist operatives. They leave virtually
no doubt that the United States has embraced the concept oftransnational armed
conflict, that the nation is engaged in an armed conflict against al Qaeda, that this
armed conflict is non-international within the meaning of the jus in bello and that it
transcends national borders. There is also no doubt that the United States invoked
the jus in bello as the framework to regulate execution of the Bin Laden m ission.
Koh's clear emphasis on the in bello variants of the principles of distinction and
proportionality cannot be read as meaning anything else.
Koh, however, included o ne q ualifier that suggests possible uncertainty. Rejecting the cr iticism that attacks such as that on Bin Laden are unlawful extrajudicial
killings, Koh noted that "a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is no t required to provide targets with legal process before the
state may use lethal force."I80What is perplexing is the "or" in the statem ent. Koh
preserved a division between armed conflict and other actio ns in legitimate selfdefense. It is significant that he asserts the right to kill as a m easure of firs t resort in
either context (which seems to rebut any inference that he is suggesting some actions in self-defense must be exercised pursuant to a law enforcement legal
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framework). Why was that "or" necessary? What was Koh suggesting if he was not
suggesting a law enforcem ent limitation to some actions in self-defense?
One possible answer is that Advisor Koh is simply preserving the authority of
the United States to act in limited self-defense against an imminent terrorist threat
that is not considered associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban. In such situations,
the attack would accordingly be unrelated to the existing armed conflict the United
States asserts is ongoing with these enemies. If this was the m eaning of his use of the
"or," it produces little confusion: imminent terrorist threats to the United States
may justify military action as an exercise of jus ad bellum self-d efense, and usc of
force for such a purpose triggers LOAC applicability. However, distinguishing
armed conflict from self-defense with an "or" could also be interpreted as an endorsement of self-d efense targeting, suggesting that uses of military force are regulated by the jus in bello or jus ad bellum principles. This is an unnecessary
dichotomy, and hopefully one that Advisor Koh did not intend. There is no viable
reason to attempt to establish such a distinction; as discussed in this essay, the suggestion that ad bellum principles are interchangeable with their in bello variants is
flawed and operationally confusing. 181
VII. Conclusion
Transnational non-State threats are not going away any time soon. Indeed, it is
likely that identifying a rational and credible legal basis for natio nal response to
such threats will continue to vex policymakers and legal advisors in the coming years.
These threats will almost certainly lead States to continue to invoke the inherent
right of national andior collective self-defense to justify extraterritorial responses.
This legal basis is not, however, an adequate substitute for defining the legal fram ework to regulate the operational exercise of this self-defense authority. Nonetheless, the adven t ofthe self-defense targeting theory purports to be just that.
The jus ad bellum was never conceived as a legal framework to regulate the execution of military operations. Instead, it is analogous to the law that permits individuals to act in self-defense when faced with an imminent threat of death or
grievous bodily harm. Like the domestic self-defense concept, jus ad bellum selfdefense reflects a necessity foundation based on minimizing situations where
States resort to force and limiting the risk of conflagration resulting from such resort. Self-d efense, as a form of self-help, is intended to be a measure of last resort,
and the jus ad bellum principles of necessity and proportionality reflect that foundation. In contrast, the jus in bello variants of these two principles are based on a
fundamentally different foundation: facilitating the prom pt submission of operational opponents in the collective-not individual-sense. Accordingly, the scope
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of permissible violence justified by the jus in bello is fundamen tally different from
that tolerated through the exercise of peacetime self- defense.
Attempting to substitute jus ad bellum principles fo r their jus in bello variants
is not only confusing; it fundamentally degrades target engagement authority.
As discussed in this essay, this degradation is the result of imposing peacetime
concepts on wartime operations. It may be conceivable that some actions in selfdefense--especiaUy in response to non-State threats-may permit only a law
enforcement-type response. For example, if members of Mexican drug cartels began engaging in violence on the U.S. side of the border requiring, in the judgment
of the President, some action to neutralize this threat, armed forces might be used
to augment law enforcement officers during a mission to capture cartel members
for subsequent trial. In such a situation, the use of armed force might be subject
to law enforcement-type use of force authority. However, even if such situations
are conceptually lodged within the scope of national self-defense authority, this
cannot justify the wholesale abandonment of jus in bello principles. Instead, the nature of the threat and the authority invoked by the State to respond to that threat
must dictate the existence of armed conflict. When States utilize armed forces and
grant them the authority to engage opponents pursuant to the LOAC rule of military objective-an invocation revealed by the employment of deadly force as a
measure of first resort-it indicates the existence of an armed conflict. It is the jus
in bello, and not the jus ad bellum, that must regulate such operations.
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General Jay S. Bybee to Co unsel to the President Alberto R. Gonzales, Status of Taliban Forces
under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention 1 (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://
www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBBI 27/020207.pdf (asserting captured members of
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the Tal iban do not meet the req uirements under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat·
ment of Prisoners of War under Article 4(A)(I), (2) or (3) and thu s can be held indefinitely
without convening a trib unal); Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice Presi·
dent Dick Cheney, Regarding Humane Treatmen t ofal Qaeda and Taliban Detainees 2 (Feb. 7,
2002), available at http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBBI27/02.02.07.pdf (adopt.
ing the recommendations of Bybee to not apply Article 3 of Geneva Convention lII to detained
aI Qaeda or T a1iban members).
34. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97
CALIFORNIA LAw REVIEW 693, 701 (2009) (discussing the law of war allowance of preventive
detention, and the Hamdi de<ision that allowed even U.S. citizens to be preventively detained
in some circumstances).
35. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2009).
36. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-30 (2006) (discussing the government's posi.
tion that Hamdan was not enti tled to the full protections of the Geneva Conventions because
the conflict did not clearly fit in to Article 2 or 3 of the Conventions).
37. [d.
38. [d.
39. See generally Michael F. Lohr & Steve GallOlla, Legal Support in War: The Role of M ilittll)' Ulwyers, 4 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 465 (2003) (discussing the role of
the military lawyer in conflicts ranging from declared Stale-On-Slate war to the war on terror).
See also 1998 Do D Law of War Program, supra note 31. The exact policy mandate required thai
the heads of the Do D components U[e]nsure that the members of their Components comply
with the law of war during all anned conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and
with the principles and sp irit of the law of war during all other operations." Jd., 1 5.3.1 . See also
U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program,. 4.1 (2006), available
at http://www.dtic.millwhs/directivesicorres/pdfI2311OIe.pdf [hereinafter Directive 2311.01E]
("Members of the Do D Components comply with the law of war d uring all anned conflicts,
however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.").
40. See generally Corn, supra note 20; Eyal Benvenisti, The Legal Battle to Define tire UlW on
Transnational Asymmetric Warfare, 20 D UKE JOURNAL Of COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw 339, 342 (2010).
41. See Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationaliud Non-International Amred Conflicts: Case Studies of AfglJanistan, Kampuchea, and LebmJOn, 33 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 145, 147
(1983) (util izing th e term "international ized non-international armed conflict» to denote an
anned conflict between State and non-State forces that transcends national boundaries).
42. Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed UJnflict, 29 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 2461, 2512
(2008) (asserting many scholars believe these types of conflicts should be classified as law enforcement operations and conducted accordingly).
43. See generally Benvenisti, supra note 40 (entire essay discussing "tension between the
two confl icting visions on the regulation of transnational armed conflict»).
44. See Com & Jensen, supra no te 12, at 66 (discussing Professor Yoram Dinstein's classification of counterterrorism activities as extraterritorial law enforcement).
45. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
46. [d. at 629-32.
47. Id.
48. [d.
49. [d.
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so. See, e.g., Corn & Jensen, supra note 12; Michael Greenberger, You Ain't Seen NothiTI'
Yet: The Inevitable Post· Hamdan Conflict Between the Supreme Court and the Political Branches,
66 MARYUND LAW REVIEW 805, 833-34 (2007).
51. Corn & Jensen, supra note 12.
52. Michael W. Lewis, Internatio,lal Myopia: Hamdlln 's Shortcut to "Victory," 42
UNIVERSITY OF RlCHMOND LAW REViEW 687, 706 (2008) n T] he Hamdlln court defined
anned 'conflict not of an international character,' determined the requiremenlS of a regularly
constituted court, and dec::ided wh at judicial guarantees are recognized as indispensable by civi·
lized people in just over five pages . . . wi thout significantly reviewing th e drafting history of
Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocols, or investigating any state practice outside this
country.~) . See Bybee Application of Treaties and Laws Memorandum, supra note 33, at 10 (as·
serting the conflict with al Qaeda does not fit into either of the two traditional categories of
anned conflict as established by Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
53. See Vogel, supra note 9, at 132 (mentioning tha t altho ugh a majority of the United
States' combat operations againsl al Qaeda are in Afghanistan, it does use drone strikes againsl
al Qaeda operatives in Yemen and Somalia). See also Gabor Rona, InterestiTlg Times for International Humanitarian UlW: Challenges from the "War on Terror," 27 FLETCHER FoRUM OF
WORlD AFFAIRS 55, 62 (2003) (mentioning one such attack in Yemen in 2(04). See International
Law Association, Use of Force Committee, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in In·
ternational Law 29-32 (2010), available at http://www.ila-hq.orglenlcommittt'($/index.cfm/cidl
1022 ]hereinafter Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflicl ] (discussing the criteria of
intensity and territorial scope aspec::1S of classifying hostili ties as armed conflict).
54. Final Report on the Meaning of Anned Conflict, supra note 53.
55. ld. at 30.
56. Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies to Combat AI.Qa'eda, the Taliban, and
Associated Forces-the First Year, 30 PACE LAW REVIEW 340, 353-54 (2010) (mentioning Presi·
dent Obama's campaign desire 10 dismantle key elements of President Bush's policies on combating terrorism and his actions shortly after entering office attempting 10 do so).
57. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 1 (mentioning the Obama administration's expanded
use of drone strikes in countries outside of Afghanislan).
58. Tess Bridgeman, TIle LAw of Neutrality and the Conflict with AI Qaeda, 85 NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY LAW REViEW 1186, 1191 (2010) (discussing the Obama administration's immedi·
ate stance that those taken prisoner in Afghanislan would be detained pursuant to the law of
anned conflict). Seea/so Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the
Habeas Lens, 52 BoSTON COLLEGE LAw REViEW 769, 830-31 (2011 ) (discussing the Ohama ad·
ministration's decision earl y in March 2009 to continue to assert its authority ~to detain with·
OUI charge pursuant 10 a substantive detention stand ard nOI m uch differen t from the
Combatant SlalUS Review Tribunal (CSRT) standard of the Bush administ ra tion~) .
59. Vogel, supra note 9, at 109 (mentioning the Uni ted States' use of drone strikes in Paki·
Sian, Somalia and Yemen).
60. JeffBovarnick,A Review of The Waron Terror and the UlWS of War: A Military Perspective, 44 NEW ENGUND LAW REVIEW 885, 892 (2010) (book review) (citing the use of deadly
force as the most basic right under the laws of armed conflict). See also Schmidle, supra note 5
(noting the "killing as a first resort" mentality was present, because nobody on the mission to
kill Osama Bin Laden wanted detainees).
61. Bovarnick, supra note 60, at 892 (again noting thai the use of dea dly force as a first reo
sort in military operations is inconsistent with law enforcement nonns).
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62. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defenu Targetings of Non-State Actors and
Permissibility of u.s. Uu of Drones in Pakistan, 19 JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND
POLlCY 237 (2010) (the entire article discussing this new alterative legal framework).
63. See Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346 (Benjamin Wittes 00.,
2009). Kenneth Anderson is a professor oflaw at the Washington College of Law at American
University. Professor Anderson is also a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University.
64. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 15. See also Kenneth Anderson, The RiS(! of InternatiolUll
Criminal Law: Intended and UniT/tended Consequences, 20 EURO PEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 331, 354 (2009) (~A1though in theory a single adjudica tor could hear
both the resort to force and conduct questions [jus ad bellum and jus in bello], and simply
maintain perfect independence, in reality the same tribunal--even with separate panelswould tend to conflicts of interest, path dependence between the two suppoS(!dly independent
areas.~ ) (emphasis added) .
65. See Paust, supra note 62, at 262 (justifying the ab ility of the United States to capture
Osama Bin Laden or other members of al Qaeda in Afghanistan or other countries simply because the hostilities with al QaOOa were commenced u nder a notion of seif-defenSt':). See also
Jordan Paust, Permissible Self-Defenu Targeting and the Death of Bin Laden, 39 DENVER
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 569 (201\). Professor Paust is the Mike and
Teresa Baker Law Center Professor of International Law at the Law Cenler of the University of
Houston.
66. Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 325, 326 (2003) (Kthe United States simply cannot be at war
n
with bin Laden and al Qaeda ) .

67. See id. generally.
68. See Paust, supra note 62, at 279

(~As this article affinns, self-defense can be pennissible
against non-state actor armed attacks, and measures of self-defense can occur in the territory of
another state without special consent of the other state or imputation of the armed attacks to
that state as long as the measures of self-defense are directed against the non-Slate actors. ~).
69. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 7 (labeling the use of force under self-defenSt': that wo uld
not be part of an armed conflict ~naked self-defenSt':").
70. See Paust, supra note 62, at 270 (stating reasonable necessity and proportionality are integrated into the law of armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions). See also Paust, supra
note 65, at 572-73 (stating the need to conduct St':lf-defense targeting within the principles of
distinction, reasonable necessity and proportionality to protect the general h uman righ t 10 life).
71. See geTJerally Paust, supra note 65, at 577-78 (discussing generally and specificall y
how the justification for self-defense targeting of non-State actors determines which targets
are al lowed to be attacked and where, as long as such decisions are based on necessity and
proportionality).
72. See Benvenisti, supra no te I, at 541 (stating the traditional dear distinction between the
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello).
73. G.I.A.D. Draper, Ethirnl and Juridical Status of ConstTailJt$ in War, 55 MILITARY U.W
REVIEW 169, 174 (1972) (the paper was first presented by Colonel Draper at the Judge Advocate
General's School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, on September 10, 1971).
74. See Sloane, supra note 11, at 48 (discussing the Special Court for Sierra Leone's Appeals
Chamber's dearly separating jus ad bellum and jus in bello by refusing to justify a defendant's
actions based on the legitimacy of his right to fight ).
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75. Id. at 65 (discussing the UN Charter's app lication of jus in bello to all belligerents, reo
gardless of their jus ad bellum status).
76. [d. (~Articles I and 2 of th e Geneva Conventions of 1949 affirmed that thejus in bello
codified in th ose treaties applied in 'all circumstances' and to 'all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict.''').
77. Id.
78. See GC I, GC II, GC III, GC IV, all supra note 22. See also Sloane, supra note II, at 65.
79. See COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III REL-\T1VE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS Of WAR 22 Oean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter COMMENTARY II1 J.
80. [d. at 28-35. SeeaIso Geoffrey S. Com, "Snipers in the Minaret- What Is the Rule?" The
LAw of War and the Protection of Cultural Property: A Complex Equation, ARMY LAWYER, July
2005, at 36 (endnote 27 discusses this topic at great length, citing to the Commentary, supra).
81. $eeCOMMENTARY III, supra note 79, at 22.
82. See Hamdan v. Rumsfdd, 548 U.S. 557,628-33 (2006) (finding the classification or de·
scription of the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda did not impact the rights de·
tainees were entitled to under the Geneva Conventions). See also Sloane, supra note II, at 75
(recognizing Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions' application in all cases of anned
conflict as "custom,~ with no mention of jus ad bellum) and at 48 (discussing the Spe;.:ial Court
for Sierra Leone's Appeals Chamber's clearly separating jus ad bellum and jus in bello by refus·
ing to justify a defendant's actions because of the legitimacy of h is right to fight); Directive
2311.01E, supra note 39 (ordering all U.S. armed forces to com ply wi th principles of the law of
war during all military operations).
83. See, e.g., Directive 2311 .01E, supra note 39.
84. See Antoine Bouvier, Assessing the Reilltionship between Jus in Bello and Ius ad Bellum:
An "Orthodox~ View, 100 AMERICAN SOCIETY Of INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 109, 110
(2006) ("The idea th at both branches [jus ad bellum and jus in bello] operate autonomously is
finnly rooted in (I) the legal literature, (2) State practice, (3) th e jurisprudence of national and
international courts and (4) several treaties.»). See also COMMENTARY III, supra note 79.
85. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts pmbl., June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(hereinafter AP II ("Reaffinning further that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 and of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who
are protected by those instruments, witho ut any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin
of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict.~ ).
86. See Directive 2311.01£, supra note 39 (ordering all U.S. armed forces to comply with
principles of the law of war (jus in bello) during aU military operations); see also 1998 000 Law
of War Program, supra note 31 (the predecessor to DoD Directive 2311 .0IE, which mandated
that heads of Defense components U(elnsure that the members of their DoD Components
comply with the law of war during all anned conf1icts, however such conflicts are characterized,
and with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all o ther operations»).
Volhether this policy directive reflects an emerging principle of customary international law
that req uires compliance with core LOAC principles during all military operations as a .. defaul t ~
setting is a question beyond the scope of this essay. However, in prior articles th is author has as·
serted th at the policy does, at a minimum, suggest that a strict interpretation of the situations
that trigger application of these core principles is inconsistent wi th the underlying objective of
the Geneva Conventions to ensure that no mili tary operation falls outside the scope of hum ani·
tarian regulation. See Com, supra note 20.
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87. See generally Paust, supra note 62 (relying simply on the right of self·defense, not on the
illegality of the attack by al Qaeda, to defend the Uni ted States' use of drone attacks against
non·State actors).
88. See generally id. (discussing self-defense targeting in great detail thro ughout the article).
89. [d.
9(). [d.
91. Id.

92. See Sloane, supra note 11, at 104 (recognizing the traditional separation-that ad
bellum judgments should not have an impact on in bello obligations). See also MICHAEL
WAlZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21 (4th I'd. 2006) (referring to ad bellum and in bello principiI'S as ~Iogically independent").
93. See Sloane, supra note 11, at 50 (discussing the troubling res ults of conflating ad bellum
and in bello principles, citing examples such as the 1999 NATO conduct in Serbia and the Bush
administration's authorization of torture against detainees).
94. See Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 541-42 (mentioning the current scholarly distinction
between ad bellum and in bello principles).
95. Id. at 546 (d iscussing the greater impact that ad bellum principles have over in bello
principles in military operations).
96. See Sloane, supra note 11, at 49-50 (discussing actions in Sierra Leone's civil war,
NATO's actions against Serbia and the Uni ted States' post-9/11 torture of detainees and the inappropriate attem pts of each relevant party to justify its in bello conduct with the legitimacy of
its ad bellum cause).
97. See Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 546 ("the percolation of ad bellum considerations into
the jus in bello proportionality analysis can prove a rather sophisticated and effective constraint
on the stronger regular army").
98. See Sloane, supra no te 11, at 103 (d iscussing the benefits of having separated ad bellum
and in bello principles: ad bellum principles to prohibit the use of force except in self-defense
situations and in bello principles to include necessity, p roportionality and discrimination in
conducting armed conflict).
99. See Paust, supra note 62, at 250 0 ustifying the Uni ted States' use of non-State actor targeting by drones across international borders as a tool in the war against al Qaeda based on the
necessity of self-defense).
100. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Overlap mId Convergence: The Interaction between Jus ad
Bell um and ' us in Bello, 12 JOURNALOF CONFUCT & SECURlTY LAw 157, 164 (2007) (citing the
existence of the concept of necessity in both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello ). See also Sloane,
supra note 11 , at 52-53 (discussing both ad bellum and in bello proportionality) and at 67 ( ~any
use o f force must be necessary and proportional relative to both the jus ad bellum and the jus in

bello" ).
101. See Michael Novak, Just Peace and the Asymmetric Threat: National Self-Defense in Uncharted Waters, 27 HARVARD JOURNAL Of LAW & PUBLIC POLlCY 817, 827 (2004) (including
the use of war as a last resort in considerations for jus ad bellum).
102. See id. (including proportionality and discrimination between combatants and noncombatants as considerations for the jus in bello).
103. See id. (ad bellum principles restrict the use of force to only proportionate means when
necessary). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S. ), 1986 I.e.,. 14,1 194 (June 27); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory O pinion, 1996 1.e.J. 226, 1 142 (July 8); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.5. ), 2003 I.e.,. 161 , 43
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(Nov. 6); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Oem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 16S,1 147 (Dec 19) .
104. DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF· DEFENSE 110-11 (2002) (stating it is "universally acknowledged that the righ t of national-defense is bounded by the same intrinsic limitations as
the right of personal self-defense").
105. See Shana Wallace, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Lawand Battered Women's
Right to Self-Defense, 71 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAw REVIEW 1749, 1766-77 (2004) (comparing the necessity and proportional ity requirements of personal and na tional self-defense).

Id.
107. Id.
lOS. Id.
109. Thomas Yoxali, Iraq mId Article 51: A Correct Use of Limited Authority, 25
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 967, 9S6 (1991) (discussing the UN Charter requirements of necessity and proportional ity in the use offorce in self-defense).
110. U.N. Charter art. I .
106.

Ill. [d.

Id., art. 51.
113. Scott S. Evans, Intemational Kidnapping in a Violent World: Where the United States
Ought to Draw the Line, 137 MILITARY LAw REVIEW IS7, 240 (1992) (detailing purposes for the
Article 51 notification req uirement, incl uding creating awareness of the aggression).
114. Brian L Bengs, Legal Constraints upon tile Use of a Tactical Nue/ear Weapon Against the
Natanz Nuclear Facility in Iran, 40 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAw REVIEW 323,
370 (200S) (ad bellum proportionality ~is intended to prevent a stale from overreacting to a situation and escalating the level of conflict~).
115. Id. This is not to suggest th e absence of uncertainty related to the scope of action permitted pursuan t to the jus ad bellum principle of proportional ity. Indeed, this remains an area
of significant international legal deba te. However, what seems relatively d ear is that whatever
the permissible scope of action, the objective is strictly limited to red uction of the imminent
threat th at triggers the righ t of national or colle<tive self-defense. As Professor David KrelZmer
notes in the abstract for his forthcoming analysis of jus ad bellum proportionality:
While force used by a state in self-defence must meet th e demands of proportionality
there is confusion over the meaning of the term in this, ius ad bellum, context. One
source of confusion lies in the existence of two competing tests of proportional ity, the
"tit for tat" and the "means-end" tests. Since the legality of un ilateral use of force by a
state depends on the legitimacy of its aim-self-defence against an anned attack-the
"means-end " test wo uld seem more appropriate. However, there is no agreement over
the legitimate ends of force em ployed to achieve this aim. Is the defending state limited
to halting and repelling t he attack t hat has occurred, or may it protect itself against
future attacks by the same enemy? Maya state that has been attacked use force in o rder
to deter the attacker from mounting further attacks? The "means-end" test of proportionality rests primarily on the necessity of the means used to ach ieve legitimate ends.
112.

Disagreements over proportionality aTe in this cont(Xt usually really disagreements oYer
those ends. While the appropriate test in this context is generally the "means-end" test,
in some cases, such as use offorce in response to a limited armed attack, the "tit for tat"
test of proportionality might be more appropriate.
See David Kretzmer, TIle [nllerent Right of Self-Defence and Proportionality in Ius ad Bellum,
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (forthcoming 2012) (emphasis added), available
at h ttp://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=201 4282; see also Taft, supra note 19

86

Geoffrey S. Com
(criticizing the overly restrictive interpretation of jus ad bellum proportionality adopted by the
In ternational Co urt of Justice in the Oil Platforms decision).
116. See Sloane, supra note II, at 67 (~The in bello concepts of ne<essity and proportionality
have ad bellum analogues-with quite distinct meanings.").
117. Id. at 74 (sta ting conflating the proportionality of jus ad bellum and jus in bello wo uld
allow a nation's self-serving ad bellum reason for engaging in conflict to impact its in bel/(J conduct
during the hostilities with the ul timate outcome being negative for the soldiers in the field).
118. Michael N. Schmitt, Clipped Wings: Effective and Legal No-Fly Zone Rules of Engagement, 20 LoYOLA Of LOS ANGELES INTERN ATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAw JOURNAL 754
( 1998) (stating necessity in reference to self-defense pertains to when force may be resorted to,
contrasted to necessity in the jus in bello context, which determines how force may be used ).
119. See Depart ment of the Anny, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 3(a) ( 1956); David
Kaye, Khash iyev 6- Akayeva v. Russia; Isayeva, Yusupova 6- Basayeva v. Russia; lsayeva v. Russia,
99 AMERICAN JOURNALOf INTERNATIONAL LAW 873, 880 (2005) (jus in bello necessity's function is to ensure that force is used to obtain a military objective). See also Craig J.5. Forrest, Tire

Doctrine of Military Necessity and the Protection of Cultural Property During Armed Conflicts. 37
CALIfORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 177, 181 (2007) (in bello necessity
forces a party to strike a balance between obtaining military victory and observing the needs of
humanity) and 183 (in bello necessity allows the pursu it of military objectives, which includes
disabling as many enemy combatants as possi ble, so long as it is done in a manner th at minimizes suffering and damage ); Department of the Air Force, AP P 110-31, International LawThe Cond uct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations 1-5-1-6 (1976) [hereinafter AFP 11O-31 [
("Military nocessity is the principle which justifies meas ures of regulated force not forbidden by
international law whic h are indispensable for securing the prompt submission of the enemy,
wi th the least possible expenditures of economic and human resources. ~) ; William A. Wilcox
Jr., Environmental Protection in Combat, 17 SOlrrHERN IllINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
299, 302 (1993) ("The concept of military necessity provides that a combatant is justified in applying any force necessary to secure the com plete submission of the enemy as soon as possible-as long as the means are not prohibited by provisions of the laws of war.").
120. See Christian Henderson, The 2010 Un ited States National Secu rity Strategy and the
Obama Doctrine of "Necessary Force, " 15 JOURNAL Of CONfUcr & SECURITY LAW 403, 423
(2010) (identifying tha t the condition in necessity as it applies to self-defense is th at the use of
force be used only as a measure of last reso rt). See also Ka ye, supra note 119, at 880 (" Necessity
in the jus in bello does not req ui re force to be a last resort.").
121. See generally Laurie R. Blank & Benjamin R. Fariey, Characterizing US Operatio1lS in Pakistan: Is the United States Engaged in Amred umflict?, 34 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL 151, 187 (20 11 ) (distinguishing between anned confl ict, which gran ts the authority to
use fo rce as a first resort, and law enforcement, which only allows force in self-defense).
122. See Ma tthew C. Waxman, TIre Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20
DUKE JOURNALOf COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 429, 447 (2010) ()usad bellum is
fundamen tally about promoting peaceful resolution of confl icts and balancing restraints on aggression with legitimate self-defense").
123. See AP I, supra note 85, art. 52(2) (~Atlacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, captu re or ne utralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage." ).
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124. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS Of 12 AUGUST 1949, 1 1389 (Yves Sand oz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zim·
mermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARYON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] ("Military
necessity means the necessity for measures which are essential to an ain the goals of war, and
which are lawful in accordance wilh the laws and customs of war.").
125. As long as Ihe use of force as a first resort comports wilh military necessity, if is valid in
anned conflict. See Blank & Farley, supra no te 121, at 187 (citing th e ability to use force as a first
resort as the primary distinction between armed confl ict: and law enforcement).
126. See Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARVA RD INTERNATIONAL LAw
JOURNAL 365, 423 (2009) (discussing Ihe authority to use force against persons and property as
an aulhority under Ihe law of war, outside Ihe scope of self-defense).
127. See Nobuo Hayashi, Requirements of Military Necessity in International Human itarian
Law aTld International Criminal Law, 28 BoSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JO URNAL
39, 114 (2010) (noting that a property's «s tatus as a military objective justifies attacks being
directed against it").
128. JEAN·JACQ UES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AN D DISCO URSES II (G.D.H. Cole
trons., ). M. Dent & Sons Ltd . 1913) (1 762).
129. See Nils Melzer, Keeping the Baulnce Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Responu to Four Critiques of the ICRC's In terpretive GuidaTlce on the Notion of Direct Participation
in Hostilities, 42 NEW YORI( UNI VERSITY JOURNAL Of INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 831,
904-5 (2010) ("lhe principle of military necessity as defined in national military manuals is addressed to governments and senior military commanders and does not in tend to restrict lhe in·
divid ual soldier's use of force against the enemy~) .
130. This tenn is used colloquially to indicate si tuations of armed conflict that trigger the jm
in bello.
131. See Melzer, supra note 129, at 904-5.
132. See Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations 6-15 (J 993) (hereinafter FM 100-5 ] (<<Commanders set favorable terms for battle by sync hronizing ground, air,
sea, space, and special operations capabilities to strike the enemy sim ul taneously Ihrougho ut
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ity of employing civilian intelligence personnel to execute missions under me rubric of jus ad
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ter may direct.").
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